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PROPERTY
Property law was an infrequent source of appellate litigation
in South Carolina during the survey period. Aside from some
problems concerning misrepresentation and mechanic's liens
there was little opportunity for the court to do more than
reiterate established principles of South Carolina law.
A case which ran the gamut from The Rule in Shelly's Case
and fee simple conditionals to color of title and constructive
adverse possession was Woodle v. Tilghman.1 Here the court
affirmed a lower court decision holding that an 1889 will, 2
finally interpreted in 1959 litigation as granting to the plaintiffs
no interest in a certain tract,3 could still provide color of title
for the constructive adverse possession of that tract.4  This
decision was based on the general view that color of title "is
anything which shows the extent of [an] occupant's claim."5
The court concluded by saying:
The principal purpose of color of title in adverse pos-
session proceedings is not to show actual grant of land
or interest therein, but to designate the boundary of
possessor's claim. It constructively extends possession
to the boundaries described in the instrument under
which color of title is claimed.-
1. 165 S.E.2d 702 (S.C. 1969).
2. The pertinent section of which read as follows:
I give and devise to Della Moneyham . . . for life only and then
unto the lawful issue of her body ... all that tract of the James
Godbolt land North of a line run . . . from the Great Pee Dee
River in the direction of Bear Branch. Id. at 703.
3. Woodle v. Tilghman, 234 S.C. 123, 107 S.E.2d 4 (1959). Here the
court reluctantly held that since The Rule in Shelly's Case was still in opera-
tion prior to 1924, Della Moneyham (Woodle) was holder of a fee simple
conditional estate and a 1903 deed to Philip Dew after the birth of issue did
serve to transfer title out of her lineage, the plaintiffs in this action.
4. Della Moneyham (Woodle) remained in possession of the property
after her conveyance until her death in 1931. From 1931 the plaintiffs occupied
the property believing they were entitled to it as the issue of Della Moneyham
(Woodle). In 1948 after a series of conveyances a deed to the tract was
recorded under the chain of title of Philip Dew and the plaintiffs sought to
have this cloud removed from their title. After the decision honoring Dew's
chain of title in 1959 (see note 3 supra), the plaintiffs filed a supplemental
complaint claiming a right to the property by adverse possession under color
of title. The defendants demurred.
5. 165 S.E.2d at 705, quoting Sprott v. Sprott, 114 S.C. 62, 72, 96 S.E.
617, 619 (1918). For a statement of the law concerning color of title, see
Mullis v. Winchester, 237 S.C. 487, 118 S.E2d 61 (1961) (cited by the court).
6. 165 S.E.2d at 705. See also Comment, Constructive Adverse Possession
Under Color of Title in South Carolina, 10 S.C.L. REv. 279 at 287 (1958).
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This seems to mean that even though the will vested no interest
in the plaintiffs, their reliance on the instrument while in ad-
verse possession could extend their claim beyond what was
actually occupied to all the land described in the will.
Belue v. Fetner7 was another case decided on basic property
law principles. It concerned a remainderman who requested
partition and sale of a forty-eight acre tract of land in Union
County. In denying defendant's claim of fee simple title to the
property the supreme court noted that it had been agreed in the
lower court s that the defendant's interest derived from an owner
of only an undivided one-half interest for life.9 Since a life
tenant can convey no more than he owns,10 even a master's deed
at a subsequent foreclosure sale could convey no more than a
life estate. The remainderman, therefore, took the property free
and clear of any claim made through the original life tenant who
died in 1963. The defendant's claim to a fee simple by adverse
possession was also quickly dismissed by the court's statement
that an adverse possessor cannot hold adversely to a remainder-
man until the life estate terminates. 1
A case of some interest is Hardin v. Horger,2 an action com-
menced by the Bishop of The Methodist Church to restrain a
seceding congregation from making use of certain church prop-
erty. The property had been granted in trust to The Methodist
Church in 18791s and had been under its control until sometime
7. 164 S.E.2d 753 (S.C. 1969).
8. Both attorneys stipulated certain facts as a basis for decision. The
court will not go beyond such agreed stipulations. Forbes v. Kingan & Co.,
174 S.C. 24, 176 S.E. 880 (1934).
9. The property in question was originally devised to Ola Belue and his two
brothers "for and during the term of their natural lives" with the remainder
given to their children respectively, each child taking only that to which his
parent had been entitled. One brother died in 1927 leaving no children. His
death left Ola Belue and his brother with undivided one-half life interests in
the property. In 1915, Ola had conveyed his life interest in forty-eight acres
of the property to his wife. She in turn mortgaged the life estate ptur autre vie
thus acquired. When the mortgage was foreclosed in 1928, the master gave a
deed at the foreclosure sale which seemed to convey a fee simple to the
property. Record at 52. After another foreclosure the property changed hands
four more times and ultimately came into the possession of the defendant,
Jack Greene, who claimed a fee simple to the property.
10. Hutto v. Ray, 192 S.C. 364, 6 S.E.2d 747 (1940).
11. Moseley v. Hankinson, 25 S.C. 519 (1886).
12. 166 S.E.2d 215 (S.C. 1969).
13. The trust deed contained the following clause:
In trust that said premises shall be used, kept, maintained and
disposed of as a place of divine worship for the use of the ministry
and membership of The Methodist Episcopal Church, South, sub-
ject to the Discipline, usage and ministerial appointments of said
[Vol. 21
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in 1963 when the congregation voted almost unanimously to
secede following The Methodist Church's failure to take action
concerning the immoral conduct of their minister.
14
The primary contention of the seceding congregation was that
the failure to take any action after numerous complaints oper-
ated as a forfeiture of the right to possession and beneficial
use of the property. The court, however, stated that even assum-
ing there had been a failure to act properly upon the congrega-
tion's complaints as provided in the Church's Discipline, no legal
significance could be attached thereto.
The argument of the congregation was defective in two
respects. First, a forfeiture will lie only where a condition pre-
cedent or condition subsequent has been created by clear and un-
ambiguous words in the deed.' 5 In the trust deed no such words
were present.'6 Second, even if there were to be a forfeiture, the
property would revert to the heirs of the original grantor,'17 not
the congregation. The court concluded that the congregation
had no legal right to-occupy the premises except as members of
The Methodist Church and therefore affirmed the circuit court's
decision to grant an injunction.
VENDOR - PURCHASER
Finley v. Dalton'8 was one of the few challenging property
cases that faced the court during the survey period. It involved
an action brought by a vendor to rescind a deed for false repre-
sentations made by an undisclosed real estate agent. The pur-
chaser had stated that he was buying the land as a long range
timber investment, when in reality he was obtaining it for a new
hydro-electric project.' 9 In sustaining a demurrer the court con-
Church, as from time to time authorized and declared by the
General Conference of said Church . . . 166 S.E2d at 217.
In Turbeville v. Morris, 203 S.C. 287, 26 S.E.2d 821 (1943) it was decided
that The Methodist Church was the legal successor to The Methodist Episco-
pal Church, South, and that it had a centralized form of government, not a
congregational or independent one.
14. In 1962 representatives of the congregation went to the District Superin-
tendent with accusations of immoral conduct on the part of the minister.
Action was promised but the following year the individual was returned to the
same parsonage. He was arrested three months later by civil authorities.
15. McManaway v. Clapp, 150 S. C. 249, 148 S.E. 18 (1929); Furman
Univ. v. Glover, 226 S.C. 1, 83 S.E.2d 559 (1954).
16. See note 13 supra.
17. Rhodes v. Black, 170 S.C. 193, 170 S.E. 158 (1933).
18. 164 S.E2d 763 (S.C. 1969).
19. Duke Power Company was secretly obtaining property for its Keowee-
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eluded that "the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to show
that the alleged misrepresentation or concealment was a material
one and that plaintiff was induced to sell because thereof.
2 0
This decision relies heavily on Warr v. Carolina Power &
Light 0.21 which quoted from 55 Am. Jun. Vendor and Pur-
chaser § 95 (1946):
A misstatement or misrepresentation made in the nego-
tiations for the purchase of land as to the use which
the purchaser intends to make of the land ... does not
necessarily constitute fraud, especially where the use
for a different purpose . . .does not injuriously affect
the vendor by reason of his ownership of other land in
the vicinity. [Such a] false statement ... is of no conse-
quence unless it appears that the statement or repre-
sentation made was material, and that the vendor relied
upon it and was induced to enter into contract thereby.
22
Finley v. Dalton is important because it clears up South Caro-
lina law on two points. First, War v. Carolina Power & Light
Co. was an action at law for damages and the language of the
court in that case 23 was uncertain authority for those seeking
a more liberal remedy in equity such as recission. In fact, the
plaintiff in Finley persuasively argued that the wording in the
Warn decision implied that while no law actions were available,
equity could always step in to remedy willful and deliberate
misrepresentations.2 4 The court decided, however, that even in
equity the essential requirement of materiality must still be met
before a remedy is available.
In examining the allegations in the complaint the court noted
that the plaintiff had retained no land in the vicinity. There
was no allegation that he had not received a fair price for his
20. 164 S.E.2d at 765.
21. 237 S.C. 121, 115 S.E.2d 799 (1960). The fact situation is Warr was
very similar to that in the case at hand in that an agent had represented that
a purchaser was paying sixty dollars an acre for land to be used as a tree farm
when in reality he was paying up to two hundred dollars an acre for hydro-
electric property.
22. Id. at 128-29, 115 S.E.2d at 803. The court in Warr avoided deciding
whether the alleged facts showed the misrepresentation to be a material one
by noting that no actual damages had been alleged. The plaintiff's claim was
said to consist of no more than a charge that he possibly could have received
more money, which did not satisfy the requirement of actual damage.
23. "We should point out that this is not an action for recission of the
deed ... but is an action at law for damages . . ." Warr v. Carolina Power
& Light Co., 237 S.C. 121, 125, 115 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1960).
24. Brief of Appellant at 10-12.
[Vol. 21
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property, since the allegation that the power company was
paying up to two hundred dollars an acre only meant that he
would have held out for more money had he known. Finally
there was no allegation that the misrepresentation operated in
any way to induce the sale. Therefore, without anything to
establish materiality, the defendant's conduct amounted to no
more than a failure to disclose the fact that Duke Power was
the real purchaser of the property. This behavior, without some
special or fiduciary relationship, could not ground a cause of
action even in equity.
A second point clarified by the court in Finley v. Dalton
concerned a statement made in Holly Hill Lumber Co. v. Me-
Coy25 that where an inquiry is made, a duty arises on the part
of an informed purchaser either to remain silent or give the
whole truth. The court remarked that while this is a sound
principle it only applies to; material representations and there-
fore is not applicable to the present fact situation.
In this decision the supreme court has more clearly defined
the necessary policy that not every untrue remark or delusive
action made in the course of arm's-length business dealings gives
rise to a cause of action. The laws of misrepresentation were in-
tended only to insure that a man receives substantially what he
bargained for. The requirement of materiality prevents a party




Piggy Park Enterprises, Inc. V. Sho field27 deals with a land-
lord who breached his convenant to obtain an easement for
ingress and egress to the leased premises. 28 In affirming a lower
court decision granting the tenant $15,600 in damages, the
supreme court stated that the measure of damages usually laid
down is the difference in the rental value of the property with
and without adherence to the convenant.29 The court continued
by saying that the rental value should be determined at the time
25. 201 S.C. 427, 23 S.E.2d 372 (1942).
26. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 103 (3d ed. 1964).
27. 251 S.C. 385, 162 S.E.2d 705 (1968).
28. The lessee signed a ten year lease with options to renew and made a
$50,000 investment in the premises for the operation of a drive-in restaurant.
In the lease the landlord promised to secure an easement to provide access
to the restaurant from an adjacent highway.
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of breach 30 and if the lease is made for a particular purpose the
rental value for that purpose should be the standard by which
damages are awarded.31 Since the breach of the convenant
rendered the tenant's restaurant inaccessible from a main high-
way, the amount of the award was not considered excessive.3 2
A second landlord-tenant case was Blanford v. Mauterer,33 an
action brought to set aside two leases made by a lessor who,
ten months after their execution, was declared mentally incom-
petent. The lessor was a property owner who had been legally
separated from his wife and thereafter entered into the two long
term leases at very low rentals8 4 in an effort to defeat his wife's
dower interest.35 In denying relief the supreme court stated
that "[i]t is not sufficient to show that the lessor's mental powers
were impaired. . . . In order to void a transaction it must be
shown that the lessor did not have sufficient capacity to under-
stand in a reasonable manner the nature and effect of the act he
was performing.
3 6
As for the grossly unreasonable and unconscionable terms of
the lease, it was stated that inadequacy of consideration alone
is not sufficient to invalidate a transaction. Instead there must
30. See Brummitt Tire Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 18 Tenn. App. 270, 75
S.W.2d 1022 (1934)(cited by the court).
31. 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 247 (1968).
32. At the trial there was undisputed testimony that the landlord had been
informed of the importance of obtaining a second entrance to the property and
that the success of the location depended heavily on such access. Three years
after the lease was signed the lessee ceased to operate on the premises and two
years later sold all his equipment for $7,500.
33. 165 S.E.2d 633 (S.C. 1969).
34. One lease, covering a large parking lot, gas station, and some rental
trailers near the main gate of Fort Jackson, had been executed for thirty years
at $4,000 a year. A second lease, for five years with three options to renew,
covered a boarding house and photographic studio which together rented for
$130 a month.
35. The lessor was very concerned about his wife's retaining dower rights in
his property and was told that he could defeat her interest by executing long
term leases at very low rentals. While there are no South Carolina cases
specifically concerning leases and the priority of dower, it is generally stated
that leases entered into by a husband after marriage will have no effect on a
wife's dower. 2 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 507 (3d ed. 1939). The case of
Elder v. McIntosh, 88 S.C. 286, 70 S.E. 807 (1911) gives a general statement
of South Carolina law by saying: "When the right of dower attaches to land,
it is paramount to the right of any other person claiming the land, or any
interesb therein under the husband by any subsequent act of his." Id. at 292,
70 S.E. at 809.
36. Blanford v. Mauterer, 165 S.E.2d 633, 638 (S.C. 1969). One problem
the plaintiffs never overcame was the fact that the first psychiatric examination
took place more than four and one-half months after the leases were executed,
which meant that any expert testimony was only conjecture and speculation.
See DuBose v. Kell, 90 S.C. 196, 71 S.E. 371 (1911), a leading case on invalida-
tion of documents for incompetence.
[Vol. 21
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be some showing of undue influence before even equitable
remedies are available. Often inadequacy may imply undue
pressure but in the case at hand this inference was rebutted by
circumstances suggesting that the lessor was simply not inter-
ested in monetary rewards.
37
AMEcAxic's LiENs
Fumner Building Supplies, I=w. v. Martin38 is a unique me-
chanic's lien case for an already unusual mechanic's lien state.
The majority of states have tended to emphasize the need to
protect the mechanic and have done this primarily by employing
a relation-back theory which gives the mechanic priority for his
lien from the time any construction work is started on a par-
ticular project.39 South Carolina takes a slightly more con-
servative approach to the problem and grants the mechanic
priority only from the time of perfection of his interest. Per-
fection is accomplished by written notice to the owner as pro-
vided by Section 45-25440 of the 1962 Code and recordation
according to Section 45-259 which makes priority of all lien
attachments a matter of public record.41 As for priority of
interests between a mortgagee and a mechanic, Section 45-55
seems to grant protection for construction loans which are
normally paid in installments.
The court in Fulmer pointed out, however, that while the
mortgagee is protected, he does not have an absolute right to
first priority. In this case the owner of real estate obtained a
$15,400 construction loan, payable in four installments as the
work progressed. After three installments were paid directly
to the contractor, a mechanic's lien was filed by a subcontractor
with notice sent to the lending institution as well as to the owner
and prime contractor. Thereafter, in disregard of the lien, the
fourth installment was paid to several parties at the direction of
37. Aside from lessening his wife's dower interest the court pointed to
friendship and relief from business worries as factors the lessor may have
considered in making the agreement.
38. 251 S.C. 353, 162 S.E2d 541 (1968).
39. There are two other views concerning the time to which the lien relates
back. Nebraska is said to give priority only from the time the mechanic begins
his particular work. R. KaAToViL, REAL EsTATE LAW 266 (4th ed. 1964).
Illinois and Maine, on the other hand, relate priority all the way back to
the date of contracting. ILu_ ANN. STAT. ch. 82, § 16 (1966) ; Ma. REv. STAT.
ch. 178, § 34 (1954).
40. See Lowndes Hill Realty Co. v. Greenville Concrete Co., 229 S.C. 619,
93 S.E.2d 855 (1956) for a discussion of the notice requirement.
41. See Williamson v. Hotel Melrose, 110 S.C. 1, 96 S.E. 407 (1918) which
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the contractor, with the subcontractor receiving only about 20%
of the amount owed him. In a consolidated foreclosure action
the issue of priority between the mechanic and the mortgagee
was raised. The lower court held that the lending institution had
priority in the amount of the first three installments, with the
subcontractor's lien having priority over the fourth installment.
On appeal the lending institution strenuously urged the appli-
cation of Section 45-55 which gives prior recorded mortgages
priority for all future advances made under the recorded instru-
ment.4 2 The court, however, pointed to Section 45-255 which
states:
Any person claiming a lien . . . who shall have given
notice provided for herein shall be entitled to be paid
in preference to the contractor at whose instance the
labor was performed.., and no payment by the owner
to the contractor thereafter shall operate to lessen the
amount recoverable by the person so giving the notice.
The conflict between Sections 45-55 and 45-255 was the real
issue in the case. Resolution came when the court decided that
since the lending institution took it upon itself to pay the final
installment as the contractor directed, it occupied the position
of the owner and therefore was bound by the owner's statutory
duties and obligations. Since the lending institution disregarded
the mechanic's lien after notice, the fourth installment could not
operate to lessen the priority of the lien, which at that time stood
next in line to the first three installments. Consequently all
subsequent advances made in disregard of the mechanic's lien
were subordinated thereto.
The holding in this case, in reality, does not present a signifi-
cant threat to the security of construction mortgages in South
Carolina, although it will require a greater involvement on the
part of lending institutions, especially in the dispersal of funds.
Once notice of a lien is received by the mortgagee his safest
course of action is to stop all future payments and contact the
contractor to appraise the entire financial situation. With small
liens a simple way to protect the mortgagee's priority and still
permit needed funds to go to the contractor so work can continue
is to make a check for the amount of the lien payable jointly to
42. South Carolina is unique in the fact that it grants priority for all future
advances, even optional ones. Almost every other state limits the grant of
priority relating back to the time of recording to obligatory future advances.
See gferally Annot., 80 A.L.R2d 179 (1961).
[Vol. 21
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the mechanic and the contractor. The balance of the installment
can go to the contractor and the two parties can settle their own
differences without hindering completion of the project.
One question mortgagees still need answered concerns the
payment of funds directly to the owner after receiving notice
of a mechanic's lien. In Fulmer, the court applied Section 45-255
to the mortgagee because he made dispersals at his own discre-
tion in disregard of the lien. While it would be difficult to
extend this theory by placing an affirmative duty on the mort-
gagee to see that the lien is paid, it is not at all impossible for
the court to see this as a logical extention of Fulnr for the
protection of the mechanic in South Carolina. For the time
being many lending institutions seem more content to stop all
payments rather than risk losing priority by paying even the
owner.
In Gantt v. Van der Hoeo43 a supplier of building materials
was denied a mechanic's lien under Section 45-251 when the
court observed that the agreement by which the owner promised
to pay the supplier contained a condition precedent which had
not been met. It was vital for the supplier to establish his claim
under Section 45-251, since the owner had already overpaid the
contractor for the work that had been done. This overpayment
meant that under Section 45-254, the normal subcontractor's
remedy, there would be no further liability on the part of the
owner.
44
Originally the supplier had agreed to provide materials to the
contractor only if he secured a promise from the owner per-
sonally guaranteeing payment. The contractor drafted an agree-
ment which read as follows:
I, William A. Gantt, [agree] with [Atlas Lumber Co.]
to pay at completion of contract a part of the total sum
to Atlas Lumber Co., Inc., and Van Builders Inc. jointly
for the amount of Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00) .4
After obtaining the owner's signature, the paper was received by
the supplier and filed without ever being read. Thereafter over
43. 251 S.C. 307, 162 S.E.2d 267 (1968).
44. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-254 (1962) reads in part: "[I]n no event shall the
aggregate amount of liens set up hereby exceed the amount due by the owner
on the contract price of the improvements made." See Wood v. Hardy, 235
S.C. 131, 110 S.E.2d 157 (1959).
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$3,000 worth of materials were furnished before the contractor
defaulted without any payments having been made to the
supplier.
Examining Section 45-251,46 the court noted that an essential
requirement was an "agreement with, or consent of, the owner"
to any furnishing of materials. Such an agreement must be
present before a mechanic's lien under this section is available.
Since the supplier relied on the signed agreement of the owner
to establish consent, the court bound the owner only according
to the terms of that consent. The supplier actually made a
unilateral mistake in thinking that he was getting an uncondi-
tional promise to pay, but this misconception could not serve
to enlarge the owner's liability. Through his own negligence
the supplier was left with only one agreement and, failing
to comply with its terms, could not demand a lien under Section
45-251.
EDWARD G. MENZ=
46. S.C. CODE ANt. § 45-251 (1962) provides:
Any person to whom a debt is due for . . .materials furnished
... in the erection... of any building, by virtue of an agreement
with, or by consent of, the owner . . . or any person having
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